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INTRODUCTION
In 2012, Nino Esposito and Drew Bosee, both residents of Pennsylvania, chose
to take advantage of the most efficient way to legally protect the interests created
over the course of their forty-year romantic relationship.
2 Pennsylvania's "Defense of Marriage Act" was still in force,3 the United States
Supreme Court had not yet taken up the issue of same-sex marriage, and marriage
equality seemed out of reach. Nino adopted Drew, a man ten years his junior, in
order to avoid reliance on easily challenged estate planning documents and to
establish a legally recognized relationship.5
Nino and Drew had no way of knowing that the Supreme Court would strike
down the federal "Defense of Marriage Act" only a year later,' nor did they suspect
that full marriage equality would arrive in 2015.' In light of this unanticipated social
progress, Nino and Drew wished to have a traditional marriage. Unfortunately, a
trial judge initially denied their petition to vacate the adoption, which left them
unable to marry due to their legal status as parent and child.' Though unfortunate,
Nino and Drew's story is not so unusual. Prior to the landmark decision in Obergefell
v. Hodges, some same-sex couples chose to pursue adult adoption as a marriage
substitute.0 Those who adopted their partner, but now wish to marry under the
auspices of Obergefell, have no guarantee that the court will grant a petition to vacate
their adoption." Where these petitions are denied, the rights of same-sex couples are
further curtailed by the very notions of traditionalism (albeit in a package labeled
"parenthood" rather than "marriage") that induced the subversive act of adopting a
romantic partner in the first place.
The implication of Obergefell, as it pertains to adult adoptions, reveals a need
for reform to ensure that adoption as a mechanism for dispersing property or as a
2 John Culhane, Before Marriage Was Possible, Gay People Adopted One Another. Now
Sons Need to Become Husbands, SLATE (Nov. 10, 2015, 1:22 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/1 1/10/adult_adoption-for.gay-couples-can-the-adop
tions be undone-formarriage.html [https://perma.cc/5335-JPSZ].
3
1Id.
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
In re Adoption of R.A.B. Jr., 153 A.3d 332, 333 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016); Culhane, supra note 2.
6 Culhane, supra note 2.
7 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607-08.
See In re Adoption ofR.A.B. Jr., 153 A.3d at 333.
Culhane, supra note 2. The Pennsylvania Superior Court ultimately reversed and remanded the
denied petition to vacate the adoption because it "frustrated the couple's ability to marry," which is now a
fundamental right. In re Adoption ofR.A.B. Jr., 153 A.3d at 336.
"0 See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Planned Parenthood: AdultAdoption and the Right ofAdoptees to
Inherit, 41 ACTEC L.J. 241, 244-45, 300 (2016); see also In re Adoption ofR.A.B.Jr.,153 A.3d at 333
(involving same-sex partners seeking adoption to "becom[e] a family unit").
" For example, in Pennsylvania, the Superior Court stated, "[T]he Adoption Act does not expressly
provide for the annulmentofadultadoption" but permits "unopposed annulment or revocation of an adult
adoption" because of the "new and unique circumstances." In re Adoption ofR.A.B., Jr., 153 A.3d at 336
(emphasis added).
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method for creating a legally-recognized relationship,12 does not interfere with the
fundamental right to marry.'3 In exploring alternative methods for vacating adult
adoptions that mitigate judicial avenues for denying the right to marry, this Note
considers how the Obergefe! decision creates a tension between our socio-legal
valuations of marriage, non-marriage, and parenthood, where one relationship must
be compromised in order to preserve the other.
First, this Note will briefly consider the history of adult adoption and the
purposes it serves in modern society. Second, it will discuss the significance of adult
adoption within the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer + ("LGBTQ+") 4
community in a time before marriage equality. Third, it will describe how the
statutorily prescribed methods for vacating adult adoptions creates the potential for
undue judicial influence. Fourth, it will examine marriage as a fundamental right and
the significance of the Obergefel'decision. Fifth, it will consider the problems faced
by LGBTQ+ couples who wish to marry but are trapped in an adoptive relationship.
Sixth, it will recommend solutions to avoid judicial infringement upon the right to
marry. Finally, it will consider the broader social implications of this newly created
need for amending the process for dissolving an adult adoption in order to facilitate
a same-sex marriage.
I. ADULT ADOPTION: HISTORY AND PURPOSES
Adult adoptions occurred in ancient Rome, where the process typically centered
on the adoption of adult males for the perpetuation of religious rights or preservation
of the adopter's family.'sAdoption outlived the Roman Empire, the medieval period,
and took hold in Continental Europe as a tool for securing succession of property
and the perpetuation of lineage.'6 In the first formalized adoption procedure, the
Napoleonic Code explicitly authorized the strategic adoption of adults in order to
mold the dispersal of property to conform with an individual's donative intent.
Despite the legal traditions concerning adoption in Continental Europe, England
12 See, e.g., Ausness, supra note 10, at 244-45, 298, 300 (explaining that same-sex couples have long
used adult adoption as a means to have a legally recognized relationship and inheritance rights before
same-sex marriage was legally recognized).
13 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015).
14 The "+" is utilized here to denote the panoply of other non-heteronormative sexual orientations
and political alignments (Ally, Intersex, Two-Spirited, Pansexual, Agender, Gender Variant, etc.). See
What Does LGBTQ+ Mean?, OK2BME, https://ok2bme.ca/resources/kids-teens/what-does-1gbtq-
mean/ [https://perma.cc/6NZ2-4S5G] (May 16, 2018).
"s Ausness, supra note 10, at 246-49; Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues, and Laws
1958-193, 17 FAM. L.Q. 173, 173-74 (1983); Louis Quarles, The LawofAdoption-A LegalAnomaly,
32 MARQ. L. REv. 237, 240 (1949). Typical to patriarchal social structures, women were rarely adopted
in ancient Rome due to their inability to carry on the surname of their would-be adoptive family. See
Ausness, supra note 10, at 246 & n.29; Paulo Barrozo, Finding Home in the World: A Deontological
Theory ofthe Right to beAdopted, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 701, 706 (2010-2011).
16 Ausness, supra note 10, at 249-5 1.
17 See id. at 250; Laura J. Schwartz, Models for Parenthood in Adoption Law: The French
Conception, 28 VAND. TRANSNAT'L L. 1069, 1093 (1995).
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did not formally recognize childhood adoption until the Adoption of Children Act
of 1926, which was silent on the issue of adult adoption.
Perhaps for want of a reference point, the United States largely accepts the
English common law as the bedrock of tradition." Unfortunately, the common law's
silent default to the idea that a parent-child relationship exists solely between an
individual and their progeny is a part of our ideological inheritance.20 Without a
common law directive, the legal procedures for adoption splintered amongst the
states, resulting in a multitude of statutory provisions that vary from one jurisdiction
to the next.21 Although these statutes are varied, the substantive apple does not fall
far from the common law tree. Across states, statutory language regarding adoption
largely intersects at the presumption that adoption occurs between an adult and a
minor to create a parent-child relationship as defined by nineteenth century family
structure, which the English common law deferred to and which is regarded as
"traditional" within our legal framework.22
II. ADULT ADOPTION IN THE LGBTQ+ COMMUNITY
Prior to marriage equality in the United States, LGBTQ+ individuals "lack[ed]
true donative freedom under . . . probate law."23 Without an established legal
relationship, relatives of a deceased gay or lesbian person could easily challenge the
decedent's dispositions to "non-family" through the doctrines of "testamentary
capacity, undue influence, and testamentary fraud."24 "These doctrines are
sufficiently nebulous to give wide breadth to a trier of fact who is intent on
disregarding testamentary plans that offend the majoritarian norm that favors
dispositions to blood relatives."25 Given the ease with which one's donative intent
could be overturned by a blood relative with standing to challenge a will26 and the
"s Ausness, supra note 10, at 251. More recently, England's "Adoption and Children Act of 2002
declares that only children [under the] age of eighteen [may] be adopted." Id.
1 See, e.g., James W. Day, Extent to Which the English Common Law and Statutes Arc in Effect,
3 U. FLA. L. REV. 303, 303-05 (1950) (discussing states' adoption of English common law).
20 See Ausness, supra note 10, at 251-52.
21 SeegenerallyK.M. Potraker, Annotation, Adoption ofAdul, 21 A.L.R.3d 1012 (1968) (reflecting
the variance in states' adoption statutes).
22 SeeAusness, supra note 10, at 242, 251-52, 304-05.
23 X. Brian Edwards, Note, True Donative Freedom: Using Mediation to Resolve the Disparate
Impact Current Succession LawHas on Committed Same-GenderLoving Couples, 23 OHIO ST.J. DISP.
RESOL. 715, 716 (2008) (footnote omitted).
24 See id. at 717; E. Gary Spitko, Judge Not: In Defense ofiMinority-Culture Arbitration, 77 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1065, 1075 (1999).
25 Edwards, supra note 23, at 717-18.
26 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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fact that the law of intestacy has long favored children over ancestors ,2 7 it makes sense
that same-sex couples pursued adult adoption as a strategic marriage substitute.28
A minority of states strictly impose "traditional" adoption values on the process
of adopting an adult by requiring a preexisting parent-child relationship;29 mandating
that the spouse or parents of the adoptee consent to the adoption;30 imposing a
minimum requisite age difference of ten years;3' or explicitly prohibiting individuals
from adopting a same-sex romantic partner.3 2 These restrictions give rise to a
consideration as to why this minority of states expressed a greater interest in
regulating adoptive relationships than marital ones. Adults who wish to marry are
not required to make a showing of the nature of their relationship; they are not
required to get parental consent; and there is no required age difference.33 Perhaps it
is because the sanctity of adoptive relationships is of greater concern to courts or
maybe it is because adult adoption was the only viable avenue for creating quasi-
marital rights of inheritance and filiation between same-sex partners, either way, in
a state that imposed any of these restrictions, the pursuit of an adult adoption as a
marriage substitute would reveal that traditionalism and subversion cannot be kept
in the same cage.
Courts displayed an awareness of adult adoption as a marriage substitute in
opinions where the homosexual relationship between the parties served as the sole
basis for rejecting the adoption. In In re Robert Paul P, the court stated that
adoption ought to imitate nature and, as such, adoptions that served as a "quasi-
matrimonial vehicle" were invalid.34 Later, in In re Adoption ofSwanson, a same-
sex couple sought to enter an adoption agreement in order to "formalize the close
emotional relationship that had existed between them for many years . . . ."3
Hearkening to United States courts' tendency to falsely conflate adoptions that occur
for the purpose of creating a parent-child relationship and those that occur for
strategic reasons and/or as a marriage substitute, the lower court had denied the
petition on the grounds that there was no pre-existing parent-child relationship
between the parties.36
27 See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 65 (9th ed.
2013) ("American intestacy law generally favors the decedent's spouse, then descendants, then parents,
and then collaterals, and more remote kindred.").
28 This is precisely the scenario that played out in In reAdoption ofAdultAnonymous, 435 N.Y.S.2d
527, 527-28, 531 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981).
29 Ausness, supra note 10, at 255.
30 Id. at 255-56.
31 Id. at 256; see also In re Adoption of L.C., 920 A.2d 155, 157 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2006)
(discussing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:22-2).
32 Ausness, supra note 10, at 256, 263-64.
33 See, e.g., 52 Am. JUR. 2D Marriage §§ 1, 4, 14-15, 18-27 (2018).
34 In re Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424, 425 (N.Y. 1984) (citing Stevens v. Halstead, 168 N.Y.S.
142, 143 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917)).
35 In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095, 1096 (Del. 1993).
36 See In re Adoption ofJohn A.S., No. 91-09-02-A, 1992 WL 361416, at *3-*4 (Del. Fam. Ct. Oct.
5, 1992) (holding an adult adoption must occur for a purpose and that purpose "[wa]s to formalize existing
parent-child relationships"); see also In re Adoption ofSwanson, 623 A.2d at 1096, 1099 (overturning
2017-2018 841
By way of independent statutes and judicial decisions interpreting adoption
statutes, most states have managed to circumvent traditionalism in granting adult
adoptions.37 But, broadening the class of individuals who may enter into an adoptive
relationship largely failed to alter the lens through which adult adoptions were
viewed.38 The factors driving many adult adoptions are quite distinct from those
motivating adoptions intended to create a parent-child relationship.39 Even where
independent adult adoption statutes are in place, their provisions mirror many
principles found in statutes authorizing the adoption of minors.40 As a result, "adult
adoption statutes and court decisions interpreting them fail to distinguish between"
adult adoptions that are sought to establish a parent-child relationship and those that
are desired for purposes that are beyond the scope of "traditional" adoptions.4'
[A]doption may affect a party's right to contest a will, to take advantage
of an anti-lapse or a pretermitted child statute, to make a workers'
compensation claim, to seek Social Security benefits, to benefit from rent
control regulations, or to take as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy.
In addition, adoption may affect inheritance tax rates and it may also affect
the amount that a surviving spouse can receive under dower or elective
share statutes.42
Various motivations compel individuals to accept the legal fiction that, through
adoption, the adoptee "acquires novel relationships that are reckoned as equivalent
to congenital ones and either wholly or partially supersede the old ties."43 Though
there are often strategic interests at play in adoptions between same-sex partners,
such as grasping at donative freedom and creating rights of filiation, there are also
more sensitive issues at stake. In a time when marriage was a privilege available only
to opposite-sex couples, many same-sex couples sought to legally formalize their
romantic relationship by way of adoption.44
Even when same-sex couples succeed in adopting for want of a legally recognized
relationship, the arrangement presented its own drawbacks. The late civil rights
the Family Court's decision to deny the adoption because the lower court had improperly "implied a new
requirement [of a preexisting parent-child relationship] into the adult adoption process").
3 See Ausness, supra note 10, at 252-55.
See, for example, id. at 253-67 (illustrating how courts and legislatures have broadened who may
enter into an adoptive relationship, but how some statutes are still construed to "unnecessarily restrict[]
the availability of adoption for many adults").
39 Id. at 243-46 (describing the motivating factors behind adult adoption).
40 Ausness, supra note 10, at 242; see also, e.g., Chelsi Honeycutt, Comment, Careful Cutting Too
Many Ties: Issues with Establishing a Parent-Child Relationship Via Adult Adoption in Texas and a
Potential Solution, 5 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 171, 177 (2012) ("Texas treats adult
adoptees the same as adopted minors for purposes of wills and trusts.").
41 SeeAusness, supra note 10, at 242.
42 Id. at 245 (footnotes omitted).
43 Robert H. Lowie, Adoption - Primitive, in 1 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 459,
459 (Edwin R.A. Seligman &Alvin Johnson eds., 1930).
44 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095, 1096 (Del. 1993); Adoption of Patricia S.,
976 A.2d 966, 967-68 (Me. 2009); Adoption of Spado, 912 A.2d 578, 579 (Me. 2007).
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activist Bayard Rustin adopted his partner, Walter Naegle, in 1982.45 Though Naegle
and Rustin's romantic relationship was well-known, Rustin's obituary cited Naegle
as his "child."46 Naegle has since lamented that this erasure of his loving relationship
with Bayard felt particularly painful.47 It is clear that even when same-sex couples
were able to pursue adoption as a marriage substitute, it served as an imperfect
solution. In addition to being unable to marry the person of their choosing because
of their status as adopter and adoptee, judicial reluctance to grant a petition to vacate
an adult adoption may mean that the adopted party will remain legally severed from
their biological families,48 which may serve as a source of psychological hardship.
Absent other motivating factors for pursuing adoption over marriage, it seems that
adult adoption as a marriage substitute for same-sex couples was a solution to a
problem that does not exist post- Obergefell. As such, Obergefell has left in its wake
a small sub-set of individuals who pursued adult adoption for want of a legally
cognizable relationship
III. PROCEDURES FOR VACATING ADULT ADOPTIONS AND THE POTENTIAL
FOR JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE
As is often the case in matters of law, the seemingly simple process of vacating,
annulling, or otherwise dissolving adult adoptions between same sex couples is far
more complicated than perhaps it should to be. The "traditional" mode of adoption
is that the adult adopter integrates the child adoptee into the family.49 As such, it is
understandable that the statutory language surrounding adoptions maintains a high
bar for dissolution.0 However, the family integration rationale of traditional
adoption does not translate to adult adoptions." Unfortunately, as previously
discussed, the statutory language surrounding adult adoption borrows so heavily from
"traditional" adoption statutes that the process for vacating an adult adoption
maintains the high standards that are applied in vacating the adoption of a minor.52
We turn now to a description of the process for undoing adult adoptions and a
consideration of the hardships faced by same sex couples who are unable to do so.
4 Diane Anderson-Minshall, Why Some Couples Must Undo Adoptions to Many, ADVOCATE
(Jan. 8, 2016, 7:04 AM), http://www.advocate.com/current-issue/2016/1/08/why-some-couples-must-
undo-adoptions-marry [https://perma.cc/4FT4-K34N].
46 d.
47 See id (noting that following Rustin's death, one reporter "suggested [to Naegle] that, because of
the adoption, [thei]r relationship was incestuous").
41 C Ausness, supra note 10, at 277-79.
49 Id. at 242.
5 2 Am. JUR. 2D Adoption §§ 141, 143-151, 154, 157-160 (2018) (discussing the stringent limits
on having an adoption order vacated, annulled, or otherwise dissolved); see also Ausness, supra note 10,
at 304.
" See Ausness, supra note 10, at 243-46 (discussing the differences between the rationales for
adopting minors versus adopting adults).
52 Id. at 304-05.
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Much like legislative language authorizing adult adoptions, statutes regarding
vacation or annulment of adult adoptions vary from state to state. Some states only
require the signature of the adoptive "parent" to terminate the adoption.53 But,
generally, adult adoptions are considered final and will not be overturned in the
absence of judicial findings of fraud, mistake, or other reason warranting relief.54 For
example, Nino Esposito and Drew Bosee's petition to have their adoption vacated
was initially denied by a trial judge who claimed that it was beyond his discretion to
dissolve the adoption due to the lack of an express statutory provision permitting
annulment." But, the refusal to vacate the adoption for fear of abusing judicial
discretion is arguably discretionary in its own right. Other judges within other states
had vacated adult adoptions for reasons similar to those presented by Nino and
Drew. 56
Some extant case law reveals that courts are most likely to rely on equitable
considerations to determine whether to grant or deny a petition to vacate an adult
adoption between same-sex couples. In HM.A. v. C.A.H1 W, the Family Court of
Delaware, Sussex County, granted movant's request to reopen and vacate an
adoption decree so that the parties could enter a civil union.57 The court reasoned
that, because the adoption occurred at a time when state law did not recognize
same-sex unions, "it [wa]s no longer equitable" for the adoption to remain valid.58
Though the H.M.A. court reached a favorable outcome, it is not certain that all
courts would be willing to view the facilitation of same-sex marriage as serving public
policy. Judge Richard Posner famously posited the notion that the canons of
statutory interpretation are so numerous and varied that there is a canon to support
nearly any stance on any issue, which ultimately facilitates what he refers to as
"judicial activism."59  Imagine, for instance, asking a former Fayette County,
Kentucky Family Court Judge who was quoted as stating that gay marriage was an
5 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 9340 (West 2018).
5 SecAusness, supra note 10, at 304 (suggesting that there is uncertainty with regard to the standards
that states' will use in terminating adult adoptive relationships); Gwendolyn L. Snodgrass, Note, Creating
Family Without Marriage: The Advantages and Disadvantages ofAdult Adoption Among Gay and
Lesbian Partners, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 75, 83-84 (1997) (discussing irrevocability as a significant
disadvantage of adult adoption); see also, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.590 (West 2018) (authorizing
adult adoption and applying the law with respect to the adoption of children to adult adoptions); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.540 (West 2018) (specifying the requirements for annulling an adoption); VA.
CODE ANN. § 63.2-1243 (West) (applying the same standards to adult and child adoption orders).
In re Adoption of R.A.B., Jr., 153 A.3d 332, 333, 336 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016); see also Culhane,
supra note 2; supra note 9 and accompanying text (highlighting that the Pennsylvania trial court's decision
was ultimately overturned).
56 See Culhane, supra note 2.
" H.M.A. v. C.A.H.W., No. 95-05-03-A, 2013 WL 1748618, at *1-3 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar. 28,
2013).
* Id. at *2.
5 See Richard A. Posner, StatutoryInterpretation-in the Classroom andin the Courtroom, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV 800, 805-07, 816 (1983).
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"oxymoron [like] jumbo shrimp"60 whether the vacation of an adoption agreement
between two consenting adults in order for them to marry constituted a valid reason
to justify relief. Due to the competing public policies of promoting marriage and
upholding the sanctity of the parent-child relationship that is established via an
adoption, it is difficult to say with certainty that all judges would seek to uphold the
former. In light of the advent of same-sex marriage as a constitutional right, the
denial of a petition to vacate an adult adoption between a same-sex couple to facilitate
their marriage both violates the supremacy clause and fails to uphold the values of
"equality, openness, flexibility, and growth" that are "critical ... [to any] . . . legal
system."'
IV. THE OBERGEFELL DECISION AND THE RIGHT TO MARRY
Although the Constitution is facially silent on the matter, the Supreme Court
has interpreted the Constitution to establish marriage as a fundamental civil right.6 2
Though some have argued that Constitutional silence mandates judicial inaction,63
the Supreme Court has taken the Due Process Clause to impute equal protection to
all races and sexual orientations.64 The operational constitutional text is Section One
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which reads:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.6"
This specific language was applied in the Supreme Court's decision Loving v
Virginia, in which ChiefJustice Earl Warren wrote that "[tihe freedom to marry has
long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men."6 6
In Obergefell v. Hodges, fifty-one years after Loving, the Supreme Court
responded to a circuit split over whether state bans on same-sex marriage violated
"oAndrew Wolfson, FamilyJudge: GayMarriage Like 'urnbo Shrimp, "COURIERJ. (Sept. 21,2016,
12:28 PM), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/2016/09/21/family-judge-gay-marriage-
like-jumbo-shrimp/90729048/ [https://perma.cc/BDC3-L9JN] (updated Sept. 22, 2016, 2:57 PM).
61 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.; Richard B. Cappalli, The Disappearance ofLegalMethod, 70 TEMP.
L. REV. 393, 395 (1997).
62 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
63 Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117
HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 nn. 34-36, 27-28, 28 n. 119, 85 &nn. 387-91 (2003) (illustrating the widespread
differences in opinion toward fundamental rights recognized through substantive due process doctrine).
64 See id. at 85 nn. 389-90 (highlighting rights that have been recognized as "fundamental" and
therefore considered within the scope of "liberty' [interests] specially protected by the Due Process
Clause").
65 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
66 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
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the Equal Protection and/or Due Process Clauses.7 Beyond simply ruling as to
whether those bans were in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme
Court issued a sweeping ruling, echoing earlier cases that recognized marriage as a
fundamental right and holding that "couples of the same-sex [could] not be deprived
of that right and that liberty."6"
Obergefell held that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry
protected by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.9 Ultimately, the four principles underpinning the protection of the
right to marry apply equally to opposite and same-sex couples: (1) the right to choose
whether and whom to marry is "inherent in the concept of individual autonomy;"0
(2) the right to marry serves relationships that are equal in importance to all who
enter them;7 ' (3) assuring the right to marry protects children and families, which
implicates the myriad of rights related to procreation and childrearing;72 and (4)
marriage is the very "keystone of our social order" and foundation of the family unit.73
The Court explained that refusing to allow same-sex couples to marry denies them a
myriad of legal rights, including those related to taxation, insurance benefits,
intestate succession, spousal evidentiary privileges, child custody and support, etc.74
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution establishes that the
Constitution, federal laws made pursuant to it, and treaties made under its authority
constitute "the supreme [1]aw of the [1]and."s7 As such, state courts are bound by the
Constitution and generally, in a conflict between state and federal law, federal law
must be applied.76 Post Obergefell, if state adoption statutes allow judges to enforce
an adult adoption between a same-sex couple or if judges construe adoption statutes
in such a way as to require enforcement of the adoption, such enforcement denies
the couple's fundamental right to marry, as recognized by the Supreme Court, and
violates the Supremacy Clause. Under the authority of the Supremacy Clause, public
policy concerns and state interests in the security of adoptive relationships must take
a back seat to the constitutionally protected fundamental right to marry.
" See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589, 2604-05 (2015). For discussion of the circuit
split that existed at the time Obergecllwas decided, see DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 396-99, 402,
406, 418-21 (6th Cir. 2014).
6S Obergecll, 135 S. Ct. at 2604.
69 C
o Id. at 2599.
71 id.
72 Id. at 2600.
73 Id. at 2601.
74 i
7 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
76 See id. art. VI, cl. 2, 3; see also LAURA E. LITTLE, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, MATERIALS,
AND PROBLEMS 647 (2013) ("Questions of federal control ... often turn on identifying the proper scope
of federal law, since the supremacy clause ... leaves no doubt that federal law can displace conflicting
state law.").
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V. PROBLEMS FACED BY SAME-SEX COUPLES IN ADOPTIVE RELATIONSHIPS
The failure of courts to dissolve adult adoptions creates a host of issues for the
those trapped in a legally recognized union that no longer best reflects the nature of
their relationship. Beyond the fact that a spousal relationship vests greater rights of
intestacy and succession," forcing a homosexual couple to remain in a legally
recognized parent-child relationship creates other, highly problematic, issues.
The most extreme point of concern for homosexual partners trapped in an
adoption that no longer serves its purpose is the possibility that they will be subject
to criminal incest statutes due to the sexual nature of their relationship." Though
this may seem outlandish, the American political landscape following the 2016
election has taken such a turn for the bizarre that one is hesitant to count anything
out. The applicability of incest statutes largely turns on whether the state recognizes
an adult adoptee as a "child" of the adopter.9
Due to the multiplicity of adoption statutes in the United States, not all adopted
adults are conferred status as the adopter's "child."" In some cases, courts included
an adopted adult within the meaning of the term "children" or "lawful children."' In
California, for example, adopted individuals are, by statute, accorded the same status
as natural children.8 2 This includes the right to succeed to the estate of the adoptive
parents.83 A California court held that the construction of a statute determines
whether the term "children" includes adopted children and that the word "children"
as used in the California statutes included all adopted persons.84 A New Mexico
Court stated that the term "lawful child" included the petitioner's adopted adult
' See Sarah Ratliff, Comment, Adult Adoption: Intestate Succession and Class Gifts Under the
Uniform Probate Code, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1777, 1784-86 (2011).
s See, e.g., Russell E. Utter,Jr., Note, The Benefis and Pitfalls ofAdultAdoption in Estate Planning
and Its Likely Future in Missouri, 80 UMKC 255, 260 (2011) (discussing "incestuous overtones" as a
potential problem of same-sex couples' adoptions).
7 See Ausness, supra note 10, at 255-58 (discussing states that have required a "[p]re-existing
parent-child relationship" for adult adoptions); Mandi Rae Urban, The HistoryofAdult Adoption
in California, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 612, 615 & n.22 (2000) ("Other disadvantages
include . . . the threat of criminal prosecution in states with affinity-based incest statutes . . . .");
see also State Criminal Incest Statutes, Am. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST. (2010),
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/criminal-incest%20chart%20_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SWU-
Z6BU] (showing that many states prohibit relationships with adopted children).
s See, e.g., Potraker, supra note 21, at §§ 3[b], 4[c], 14, 18[c]-[d] (discussing variation among states
with regard to adult adoptees' classification as children of the adopter).
s' See, e.g. Sanders v. Yanez, 190 Cal. Rptr. 3d 495, 499-501 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (interpreting
Texas law and ruling that "adult adoption create[d] a parent-child relationship 'for all purposes."'); see id.
at 499 (noting that "[t]he status of an adopted child is determined by the laws of the state in which the
adoption was effected" (quoting In re Hebert's Estate, 109 P.2d 729, 730 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941))).
12 In re Estate of Stanford, 315 P.2d 681, 689 (Cal. 1957) ("It has been the policy of this state, at
least since the adoption of the Civil Code, to accord to adopted children the same status as natural
children.").
13 Id. at 689-90; see also CAL. PROB. CODE § 6450(b) (West 2018).
14 In re Estate ofStanford, 315 P.2d at 691.
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stepdaughter." Illinois expressly limits its statute's reach in cases of aggravated incest
to sexual relations between parents and adopted minors under the age of eighteen
years, thereby implicitly acknowledging that unrelated adults have the right to decide
for themselves what type of sexual relationships to pursue and with whom."
For adult adoptees of their romantic partners, the status of "child" has become a
double-edged sword: where granted it may subject them to criminal incest statutes,
where denied, the adoption may not have the desired influence with regard to
jurisdictional laws of intestacy. Iowa courts, for instance, adhere to the Loco Parentis
rule, which provides that adopted adults are not ordinarily considered the adopter's
"'child' or 'legally adopted child' unless the adult [had originally been] taken into the
adoptive home as a minor and reared as a member of adopting parent's family.""
The threat of falling under the purview of criminal incest statutes is certainly
jarring, but at the heart of the matter is the fact that adult adoptions that are not
vacated could either prevent same-sex couples from marrying or, where the parties
attempt to marry in spite of their legal status as parent and child, that their unions
could be voided.
VI. SOLUTIONS
This Note now turns to two possible safeguards against state judicial
infringement upon the Obergefell decision. Though this is far from an exhaustive
list, these proposed solutions are initial steps in finding legal solutions for same-sex
couples who had once pursued adult adoption as a marriage substitute but now wish
to exercise the fundamental right to marry. The first addresses the nature of the
constitutional interests at stake, the second speaks to the nature of adult adoptions.
A. Federal Statutory Provision
Although family law is thoroughly entrenched in state-specific statutory law, the
interests at stake in dissolving adult adoptions following Obergefell are so
constitutional in nature that they would legitimize the passage of a federal provision
allowing gay and lesbian couples to marry by vacating their adoptions. Although
Nino and Drew ultimately won on appeal and were able to marry," they could have
avoided additional court costs and emotional hardship had the trial court been made
subject to a remedial federal statute that mitigates judicial discretion where same sex
couples wish to vacate an adult adoption in order to marry.
Broadly speaking, remedial statutes are statutes that are designed to introduce
new regulations for the advancement of social welfare or are conducive to the social
good." Given the language of Obergefell, it seems that both marriage and the right
" Delaney v. First Nat'1 Bank, 386 P.2d 711, 713, 716 (N.M. 1963).
16 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-11(a)(2) (West 2018).
s First Nat'1 Bank of Dubuque v. Mackey, 338 N.W.2d 361, 365 (Iowa 1983).
s In re Adoption of R.A.B., Jr., 153 A.3d 332, 336 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).
8 See, e.g., In reMcConnell, 18 P.2d 629, 630 (Wyo. 1933).
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to equal protection under the law are both matters of social welfare." As such, a
remedial statute to advance the matters of social welfare present in the Obergefe!
decision would be within reason.
The Uniform Adoption Act of 1994, which has already been adopted in its
entirety by several states," could easily serve as the template for such a remedial
federal statute. However, it would be unwieldy and unnecessary to implement the
entirety of the act as a federal statute. The language in § 5 of the 1994 Uniform
Adoption Act concerning adult adoptions could be amended to remove the avenues
for judicial discretion in procedures for vacating adult adoptions between same sex
couples who wish to marry.92 Judges Posner and Easterbrook have persuasively
explained, in a series of cases, that maxims of statutory construction suggesting that
certain types of statutes should be interpreted "liberally" and other types "strictly" are
among "the least persuasive canons" and are "useless in deciding concrete
cases."93 But, it is still a widely accepted maxim that remedial statutes ought to be
construed liberally.9 4 As such, a federal remedial statute would need to be narrowly
tailored to facilitate vacating adult adoptions between gay and lesbian couples to
further the public interest espoused by the ObergefeH opinion without infringing
upon the public interest in the practice of "traditional" adoption as a secure method
of forming familial bonds.
This approach is the more extreme of the two, as "federalism in family law is long
and deeply established in judicial precedents, including a long-line of decisions by
the Supreme Court of the United States.""However it is worth noting that, in
practice, this concept seems to only come out of hiding when critics of marriage
equality are searching for an ideological foothold.6 Consider, for example, the
proposed Federal Marriage Amendment, introduced in the House of
Representatives in 2002 and reintroduced in 2003, which in its entirety read:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and
a woman. Neither this Constitution or the constitution of any State, nor
state or federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the
legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.7
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
See Unif. Adoption Act, 9 U.L.A. (West Supp. 1995); see also NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-50 (West
Supp. 1981); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN §§ 170-B:20, :22 (1977); CAL. PROB. CODE § 257 (West 1956).
92 See Unif. Adoption Act, 9 U.L.A. Part 5 (West Supp. 1995).
93 See Stomper v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 241, 27 F.3d 316, 320 (7th Cir. 1994);
Bushendorf v. Freightliner Corp., 13 F.3d 1024, 1026 (7th Cir. 1993); Contract Courier Servs., Inc. v.
Research & Special Program Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp., 924 F.2d 112, 115 (7th Cir. 1991).
94 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 59, at 808-09.
9 See Lynn D. Wardle, Tyranny, Federalism, and the Federal Marriage Act, 17 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 221, 240 (2005).
96 See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Proposed Federal Marriage Amendment and the Risks to
Federalism in FamilyLaw, 2 U. SAINT THOMAs LJ. 137, 137-40 (2004).
97 H.RJ. REs. 56, 108th Cong. (2003). For a more detailed discussion of the legislative history
surrounding the Federal Marriage Act, see Wardle, supra note 96, at 142-46.
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The principle of "federalism in family law" has been wielded both to support and
oppose the Federal Marriage Amendment on the grounds that it abolished same-sex
marriage and did not do enough to outlaw all same-sex unions, respectively."
As previously discussed, there is an established federal constitutional pretext for
preemption via the Supremacy Clause." Some commentators have argued that the
Supremacy Clause in and of itself renders the principle of "federalism in family law.
. . a dead letter."'00 Although enacting a remedial federal statute would be highly
controversial, the current statutory schema for vacating adult adoption in most states
is preempted by the Obergefelldecision.''
B. Adult Adoptions as Con tractualAgreements
This Note also seeks to reconcile the critiques of courts that denied the adoption
of LGBTQ+ individuals and the need for uniform procedures to ensure that the right
for gay and lesbian couples to marry is upheld. In rejecting the petition for adoption
in In reAdoption ofRobertPaulP, the court noted that it was inappropriate to use
adult adoption to achieve the objectives that are achieved by marriage, wills, and
business contracts.0 2 The court missed the point in its analysis, as clearly these two
adult men would have pursued marriage if it was available because it provides as much
security as an adoptive relationship. But, the case does provide some insight into how
adult adoptions could be re-conceptualized to make the process of vacating them
more mechanical and thereby less prone to judicial interference.
To think about the nature of an adoptive relationship between adult members, it
makes little sense that it would be caught up in the social and legal sentimentality
associated with the adoption of minors. Professor Richard Ausness of the University
of Kentucky College of Law succinctly describes the differences between adult
adoptions and "traditional adoptions" as they influence how adoptions ought to be
terminated:
Perhaps where a "familial" [adult] adoption is concerned, the adoptive
relationship should be terminated by a judicial decree with an appearance
by one or both parties. However, in [the case of] other [adult adoptions],
if the rights of third parties are not affected, perhaps either party should
have the power to terminate the relationship by written notice to the
other.... [Wlhile it may be appropriate to refer to one party as a "parent"
and the other as a "child" in the context of a familial adult adoption, it
makes no sense when a member of a same sex couple adopts the other. .
9 See Wardle, supra note 96, at 139-40.
9 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2; see also supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
.oo Wardle, supra note 96, at 140; Wardle, supra note 95, at 244-45.
101 See generallyObergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
102 SeeIn re Robert P., 458 N.Y.S.2d 178, 180 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1983), affdsub. non. In reAdoption
of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424, 425-27 (N.Y. 1984).
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. . [J]t is inaccurate to describe a relationship between equals as "parental"
in nature.1 03
Because adult adoptions between same-sex couples are generally used as "proxies
for marriage"'0 4 to "establish rights and responsibilities between same-sex
cohabitators,"'0 5 it makes sense to think of an adult adoption as a contractual
agreement as opposed to a "traditional" adoption.'o6 It is drilled into the minds of
every aspiring attorney in this country that the formation of a contract requires an
offer, consideration, acceptance, and mutuality.'07 Where two gay or lesbian partners
sign a document conferring to one the intestacy status of the other's issue, it is plain
that all elements of a contract are met.
Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution bars interference
with any private contract,10 which may serve as some relief to those who fear that
the doctrine of "federalism in family law" would be tread upon by allowing same-sex
partners to terminate legal relationships that no longer best serve their needs. The
process for terminating an adult adoption would be streamlined, as the termination
of a contract may be independently negotiated and agreed upon without court
interference. Conceptualizing adult adoption as a contractual agreement would bring
the practice of adult adoption out of conflict with the Obergefell decision and would
save the courts a good deal of work.
Though by far the simplest solution to streamline the termination of adult
adoptions, the notion of treating adult adoptions as a contract may be harmful to
those who enter into the adoption for the sheer purpose of establishing the parent-
child relationship that is established in "traditional" adoptions. Though rare, adult
adoptions do occur for the sole purpose of establishing a familial relationship.o'0 This
practice has been seen by courts between an individual and their caregiver that had
long been considered a child by the family"o or in the adoption of adult
stepchildren."' But, concerns regarding adult adoptions for familial relationship




105 Lisa M. Farabee, Note, Marriage, Equal Protection, and NewJudicial Federalism: The View from
the States, 14 YALE L. &POL'Y REv. 237, 240 (1996).
16 See, e.g., In re Estate of Griswold, 354 A.2d 717, 726 (1976) ("Adoption of adults is ordinarily
quite simple and almost in the nature of a civil contract."); Ausness, supra note 10, at 268 &n.269 (noting
that some courts viewed the adoption process as "contractual in nature" in determining the adopted child's
inheritance rights); id. at 299 ("[Adult adoptions] are strategic in nature and the essential relationship
between the parties is contractual rather than familial in character."); Farabee, supra note 105, at 237-40;
Arthur Jay Silverstein, Adoption in jewish Law, 48 CONN. Bj. 73, 75, 81-82 (1974) (discussing "Jewish
law's conception of adoption as simply an enforceable contract or promise to support the child"); Lisa R.
Zimmer, Note, Family Marriage, and the Same-Sex Couple, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 681, 688-92 (1990).
107 See generally CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS
IN CONTRACT LAW 31-209 (7th ed. 2012).
10s U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
109 See Ausness, supra note 10, at 254, 256-57, 297-98.
110 See In re Adoption of Elizabeth P.S., 509 N.Y.S.2d 746, 747-48 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1986).
1 See In re Estate of Brittin, 664 N.E.2d 687, 688, 690-91 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
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purposes could be addressed within the language of the contract itself. Parties
wishing to establish a familial bond could provide express provisions within the
language of their agreement. If parties to an adult adoption wishing to establish a
familial relationship take offense that their familial bond, if re-conceptualized as a
contractual agreement, could be voided by one or both parties, they could incorporate
a robust termination clause in their contract.
VII. BROADER IMPLICATIONS
Beyond potentially violating the Supremacy Clause, denying a petition to
vacate an adult adoption to facilitate marriage implicitly prioritizes adoptive
relationships over marital ones. Public policy has long favored marriage and
parenthood.112 But, the necessity of vacating an adoption between same-sex partners
to facilitate their marriage pits the two relationships, which are often considered by
policy makers to exist in tandem,"3 against one another.
Although the law stakes an interest in upholding familial autonomy, states have
long "influence[d] families by enacting legal rules that provide incentives ... [to]
shape familial behavior.""4 "Choice architecture," or "the state['s] influence[] [on]
families [through] describing, framing, or presenting choices in a manner that affects
decisions," has been cited as a legal method for impacting familial outcomes."5 For
example, choice architecture can be seen in the distribution of property that occurs
at death: most states adhere to equitable property distribution, thereby ensuring that
homemakers are able to take despite their low earning capacity during the
marriage."' These rules, though arguably for the betterment for society, allow the
social norm that "marriage is a partnership" centered around household management
to bleed into legislation."7
112 See, e.g., Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982) ("It is rooted in the common
experience of mankind, which teaches that parent and child normally share a strong attachment or bond
for each other, that a natural parent will normally sacrifice personal interest and welfare for the child's
benefit, and that a natural parent is normally more sympathetic and understanding and better able to win
the confidence and love of the child than anyone else." (citing Walton v. Coffman, 169 P.2d 97, 103
(Utah 1946))); Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, HOPSTRA L. REV.
495, 500-01 (1992).
113 See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
1207, 1207-09 (1999) (discussing the definition of "family" and noting that while "[t]oday there is much
less agreement about .. . who should be considered 'family,' [t]he traditional core of husband and wife,
with or without children, seems to qualify in all definitions").
114 See Clare Huntington, Familial Norms and Normality, 59 EMORY LJ. 1103, 1106, 1111-13
(2010).
... Id. at 1114 (citing RICHARD H. THALER & CASS. R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
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Though marriages are created and recognized by law, they are privately lived and
widely varied in practice."' To individuals within a marital relationship, a marriage
may serve as a symbolic commitment, an economically advantageous arrangement,
or "a religious mandate.""' Beyond the individual level, "the society that constructs
and contains [marriage]" ascribes particular meanings to it.120 Social interests in
marriage include the establishment of a system for "property transfers at death" and
the perpetuation of a moral and religious order.121 It has even been argued that
marriage exists to reign in and confine male sexuality for the betterment of society as
a whole.122 These outdated modalities of marriage limit the development of family
law and fail to align with the way that marriage is experienced at he individual
level.123
Like marriage, adoption is legally granted but privately lived. Adoption is also
like marriage in that the social interests informing adoption policy are largely
incongruent with individual motivations for pursuing adoption, particularly with
adoptions that occur between adults. Perhaps the judicial pause in granting petitions
to vacate adult adoptions stems from a concern about corrupting the institution of
parenthood or a concern that adoptions that occur for the purpose of establishing a
parent-child relationship are somehow diminished when petitions to vacate adult
adoptions are granted. This pause, however, makes little sense where there are such
a wide range of motivating factors for adult adoption that do not involve the
establishment of a parent-child relationship.124 Early 20th century scholars have
described adoption as "an institution of high morality; for the love between parent
and child is of the highest ethical and educative value . . . ."125 Although this is
certainly a charming sentiment, it fails to reflect the realities of same-sex couples who
entered an adoptive relationship as a marriage substitute and should not serve as the
basis for statutory language governing the formation and dissolution of adult
adoptions.126
When the enforcement of an adoptive relationship serves as a blockade to
marriage, sociological fictions regarding the nature of family are levied at the judicial
level under the guise of public policy. Same-sex couples who are trapped in an
adoptive relationship and unable to marry may be made subject to negative
psychological and legal implications that hinge on the idea that they are engaged in
a parent-child relationship. This judicial imposition of social norms regarding the
nature of family is antithetical to the law's continued interest in familial autonomy.







123 See id. at 240-41, 244-45.
124 See Ausness, supra note 10, at 243-46.
125 Josef Kohler, Survey ofArticial Relationships, in 2 EVOLUTION OF LAW: PRIMITIVE AND
ANCIENT LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 341,341 (comp. by Albert Kocourek &John H. Wigmore, 1915).
126 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-50 (West Supp. 1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 170-B:20, :22
(1977); CAL. PROB. CODE § 257 (West 1956).
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Though the Obergefell decision is undoubtedly equivocated with social
progressivism, it is worth noting that ultimately couches marriage as an end within
itself, rather than a means to an end. This is to say that the thrust of ObergefeH
contemplates the primacy of marriage as an institution rather than individual
autonomy in the formation of relationships and the sharing of benefits. Denial of a
petition to vacate an adult adoption designed to facilitate a same-sex marriage further
heightens the inequality between marital and non-marital relationships that was
exacerbated in the Obergefell decision. Although the decision in Lawrence v. Texas
is often cited as the groundwork for the Obergefell decision, it is worth noting that
Lawrence ultimately espoused an ambivalence toward the prioritization of marital
and non-marital sexual relationships rather than staking an interest in the legality of
same-sex marriage.'27 But, the Lawrence decision has been taken and interpreted to
uphold marriage equality in the Obergefell decision.128 Though this may be a boon
for many, Obergefell ultimately serves to funnel gay and lesbian couples who are
engaged in non-traditional family structures into marriage. As Professor Melissa
Murray noted: "Obergefellbuilds the case for equal access to marriage on the premise
that marriage is the most profound, dignified, and fundamental institution into
which individuals may enter. Alternatives to marriage . . . are by comparison
undignified, less profound, and less valuable."1 29 Even when a same-sex couple in an
adoptive relationship does not wish to marry, marriage may seem compulsory in
order to secure superior rights of inheritance and filiation, as well as to take better
advantage of social programs aimed at incentivizing marriage.'30 In sum, there exists
a fair amount of irony in the denial of a petition to vacate an adult adoption in order
to facilitate a same-sex marriage in that it imposes social norms to restrict a transition
from a subversive family structure to one that more closely aligns with how our
society and legal system conceives of marriage.
CONCLUSION
Where same-sex couples adopt one another but later wish to marry and are
denied their petition to vacate their adoptions, they are denied superior rights of
inheritance and, more importantly, they are denied the due process of law and equal
protection of the laws granted to them by the Fourteenth Amendment. Nino
Esposito and Drew Bosee were eventually able to marry, but does that truly excuse
127 See Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 53-54 (2012); see also
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563-64 (2003).
121 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589-90, 2598-99 (2015).
129 Melissa Murray, Essay, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarrage Inequality, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
1207, 1210 (2016).
130 See id. at 1210-11, 1258.; see also Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The
Case ofGayandLesbian Families, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1299, 1307-08, 1346, 1363 &n.383, 1390 &
n.552 (1997).
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the interim between trial and appeal during which they were denied superior rights
of inheritance and could have been made subject to criminal incest statutes?'3 '
The procedural language in place for the vacation of adult adoption varies from
one jurisdiction from the next, but each iteration largely relies on judicial findings of
fraud, mistake, or other reasons justifying relief.13 2 Though it may seem that the
procedure for vacating adult adoptions is simply a formality or that compassion and
common sense would guide any judge to vacate an adoption between a same-sex
couple who wished to marry, the current American political landscape has taught us
that reason and compassion do not always win the day.
This Note contemplated two possible solutions to the hole in the law regarding
the dissolution of adult adoptions. First, the implementation of a remedial federal
statute. This avenue is less likely in light of the spirit of our current federal governing
body and the fact that family law has traditionally fallen under the state's purview.
But, it is not beyond reason to suspect that the Obergefell opinion is attempting to
inch our legislative scheme away from "federalism in family law" and toward an
understanding of family law that falls within federal jurisdiction.
Second, this Note suggested that a re-conceptualization of adult adoptions as
contractual agreements could streamline the process of vacating adult adoptions.
This, however, is problematic in its own right as it would ultimately serve to remove
adult adoption agreements from the courts entirely. Though courts may welcome the
lightened workload, allowing individuals to freely contract themselves in to and out
of familial relationships could radically alter the family structure. But, this argument
may prove to be less than persuasive in practice, as it seems unlikely that an adult
wishing to form a "parent-child" relationship for sentimental reasons would want to
breach or otherwise excuse themselves from the agreement.
In identifying the need to reform procedures for vacating adult adoptions, this
Note has brought the tension between legislative interests in romantic and familial
relationships into focus. Trapping same-sex couples in an adoptive relationship that
does not best reflect the nature of their relationship subjects them to undesirable
consequences imply because the exercise of a fundamental right to marry does not
fall within courts' understanding of "other reason[s] justifying relief."'33 This Note
also touched on how Obergefell may have ultimately denigrated the reception of
non-marital romantic relationships between same-sex partners to the point that
marriage is nearly compulsory for same-sex partners who had previously adopted one
another.
Adoption is a sensitive subject, especially as it applies to adults, and rightfully so.
Any solution reached for vacating adult, same-sex couple adoptions should temper
the social interests present in both marriage and the formation of familial bonds. It
is difficult to imagine how the current procedures for vacating adult adoptions could
131 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
132 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
133 See, e.g., DEL. FAM. CT. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
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be unified or modified to mitigate judicial infringement upon the rights of members
within the LGBTQ+ community. Although it is not simple, it must be done.
[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the
person, and ... couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right
and that liberty. . . . [S]ame-sex couples may exercise the fundamental
right to marry .... State laws ... are now held invalid to the extent they
exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and
conditions as opposite-sex couples13 4
Under Obergefell, state legislation that grants judicial discretion in granting or
denying petitions to vacate adult adoptions should be deemed invalid to the extent
that they bar same-sex couples for marrying. It is the responsibility of lawmakers to
modify the systems that are in place so that no one may be impeded in the exercise
of their fundamental rights.
134 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015).
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